In a game of endogenous trade agreements between three countries, we show that while the pursuit of customs unions (CUs) prevents global free trade from emerging as a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium, the pursuit of free trade agreements (FTAs) does not. This result re ‡ects the relatively ‡exible nature of FTAs: whereas each FTA member can independently undertake further trade liberalization with respect to the non-member, CU members must do so as a group due to their common external tari¤. By diverting members'exports away from the non-member, both types of trade agreements induce the non-member to voluntarily lower its import tari¤s.
Introduction
Preferential trade agreements (PTAs) are more popular than ever before while multilateral trade liberalization seems to have come to a standstill. The ever increasing popularity of PTAs can be gauged from the fact that as of 7 April 2015, 612 noti…cations of PTAs (counting goods and services separately) had been received by the GATT/WTO. Of these noti…cations, 406 PTAs are already in force with others scheduled for implementation in the near future. By contrast, despite fourteen years of …tful negotiations, the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations has failed to yield a bargain that is acceptable to all sides. Economists and policy-makers have long suspected that the contrasting fortunes of these two types of trade liberalization may be inter-related. More speci…cally, there is widespread concern that the formation of PTAs may undermine multilateral liberalization.
Our objective in this paper is to investigate this issue with a …ner lens by comparing the implications of the two most popular types of PTAs -i.e. free trade agreements (FTAs) and customs unions (CUs) -for the prospects of global free trade. 1 As is well known, the central di¤erence between an FTA and a CU is that members of a CU impose common external tari¤s on non-members whereas FTA members adopt individually optimal tari¤s. This di¤erence in tari¤ setting behavior between the two types of PTAs has two important consequences. First, while an FTA member is free to enter into additional trade agreements with non-member countries without requiring consent from its existing FTA partners, a CU member can only do so if all other members also agree to participate in the new agreements. 2 In other words, FTA members enjoy more ‡exibility than CU members. Second, as noted in Bagwell and Staiger (1997a) and Bond and Syropoulos (1996) , the coordination of tari¤s within a CU allows members to pool their market power, thereby leading them to impose relatively higher external tari¤s than FTAs.
The objective of this paper is to isolate the implications of these fundamental di¤erences between FTAs and CUs for the prospects of free trade in the global economy. Our modeling approach follows that of Saggi and Yildiz (2010) and Saggi et al. (2013) under which PTAs emerge endogenously as the outcome of a game of trade liberalization between three countries that are free to pick their PTA partners as well as their tari¤ levels. We derive 1 Roughly 90% of the existing PTAs take the form of FTAs, with CUs comprising the rest (Freund and Ornelas, 2010) . However, the existing CUs do involve major trading areas of the world: the EU and much of Latin America (where MERCOSUR resides). 2 For example, the United States has signed several FTAs since the rati…cation of NAFTA in 1995 that do not include Mexico and Canada as partners whereas the FTAs that the European Union has entered into over the years have required the approval and participation of all its existing members.
Nash equilibria of two games of PTA formation (called the FTA game and the CU game) and then isolate their set of coalition proof Nash equilibria (CPNE). Thus, our focus is on Nash agreements that are immune to self-enforcing coalitional deviations. As in Bernheim et al. (1987) , all countries are free to arrange mutually bene…cial deviations from Nash agreements and an initial coalitional deviation of two countries from a Nash equilibrium is self-enforcing if, taking the strategy of the third country as …xed, neither member of the deviating coalition has an incentive to further deviate to make itself better o¤.
In the …rst stage of either game, each country simultaneously announces the names of countries with whom it wants to sign a PTA. Next, given the trade policy regime, countries choose their optimal tari¤s. In the …nal stage of the game, production, consumption and international trade take place. The mapping between …rst stage announcements and trade agreements is as follows. If no announcements match or the only matching announcement is in favor of no agreement, then no PTA is formed. A bilateral PTA arises if two countries announce each others'names and there is no other matching announcement. Since FTA members choose their external tari¤s independently, two independent FTAs (or a hub and spoke trading regime) can arise in the FTA game and this happens if (i) a country (call it the hub) announces in favor of signing an FTA with the other two countries and (ii) the other two countries (spokes) announce in favor of signing an FTA with the hub country and at least one of them does not announce in favor of the other. By contrast, since CU members impose common external tari¤s, a hub and spoke type of trading arrangement is infeasible in the CU game. In either game, free trade emerges only if each country seeks a PTA with both its trading partners.
Our paper addresses the important issue of when and why countries prefer to liberalize preferentially as opposed to doing so multilaterally. By contrast, existing literature generally takes one of two approaches: (i) it either takes PTAs to be exogenously given and compares incentives for multilateral liberalization in their presence to those in their absence or (ii) it simply asks whether a pair of countries bene…t from entering into a PTA given that there exists no trade agreement between them, a comparison that does not tell us much about when and why they might deliberately choose to exclude others from their mutual trade liberalization. To address the exclusion incentive in a convincing manner, one needs a model that gives all countries an active voice in negotiations so that one can determine whether some countries prefer to exclude others from their mutual trade liberalization even though they wish to be included. We provide such a model and use it to assess the strength of the exclusion incentive under our two games as well as the ability of member countries to exercise it in equilibrium.
The fact that external trade liberalization by a CU member is conditional on the approval of other members implies that, relative to a CU, an FTA is more susceptible to opportunistic unilateral deviations by member countries. To see this clearly, consider the FTA game and suppose countries i and j announce in favor of an FTA with each other.
Then, country i is free to seek a separate FTA with country k in order to create a pair of independent bilateral FTAs (i.e. a hub and spoke arrangement) with itself as the hub and countries j and k as the spokes. By contrast, in the CU game, if countries i and j announce in favor of a CU with each other, the only way one of them can undertake further trade liberalization with country k is if they both agree to reduce their common external tari¤.
We show that this crucial di¤erence between a CU and an FTA has important consequences for multilateral trade liberalization. In particular, in our three country model of symmetric countries, while free trade obtains as the unique CPNE of the FTA game, a CU between only two countries emerges as the unique CPNE of the CU game. Thus, in our model, the pursuit of CUs undermines global free trade whereas that of FTAs does not even though the exclusion incentive exists under both types of PTAs in the sense that the welfare of members of both types of PTAs is strictly higher than that under free trade.
The intuition behind this key result is as follows. Suppose each country announces in favor of forming an FTA with both other countries so that the resulting outcome is free trade. Due to the existence of an exclusion incentive in our model, two of these countries (say i and j), taking the announcement of their complement as …xed (i.e. country k still announces in favor of FTAs with both i and j), bene…t if they jointly deviate to announcements wherein they call for an FTA with only each other. As per the concept of a CPNE, for this joint deviation to be self enforcing, a proper subset of the initially deviating countries (i.e. i or j) should not have an incentive to deviate to another announcement, taking the announcement of the complement (country k) as …xed. However, in the FTA game, each of the initially deviating country (i or j) indeed has an incentive to deviate to an announcement in favor of FTAs with both countries since the welfare of a hub country exceeds that of the member of a single FTA. Therefore, the initial joint deviation of countries i and j from free trade is not self-enforcing and the CPNE of the FTA game yields free trade. By contrast, since members of a CU impose a common external tari¤, two independent CUs (a hub and spoke type arrangement) are infeasible and the initial joint deviation of two countries that converts free trade to a bilateral CU is self-enforcing so that the CPNE of the CU game yields a bilateral CU. Thus, whereas the exclusion incentive is re ‡ected in the equilibrium of the CU game, it goes unexpressed in the FTA game due to the lure of a hub and spoke arrangement and the ‡exibility that FTA members have to pursue such an arrangement. Our underlying trade model is an adapted version of the two-country comparative advantage based framework of Horn et al. (2010) where each country exports a unique good to the other two. This competing importers framework delivers a novel type of tari¤ complementarity: when two countries form a PTA (either an FTA or a CU), the excluded country voluntarily reduces its tari¤s on them. 3 As a result, PTA members bene…t not only from their mutual trade liberalization but also from the unilateral liberalization induced in the non-member country. This …nding is reminiscent of the reciprocated unilateralism result of Krishna and Mitra (2005) who showed that unilateral tari¤ liberalization by a (large) country can result in a reciprocal tari¤ reduction by its smaller trading partner. 4 In their model, unilateral liberalization by the large country encourages the formation of an export lobby in the small country which then competes e¤ectively with the import-competing lobby to lower tari¤s and export taxes.
Our competing importers framework highlights a type of trade diversion that has generally been overlooked in the literature. Traditionally, trade diversion is de…ned as the increase in trade between PTA members that occurs at the expense of exports of nonmembers to the PTA, i.e., the traditional notion of trade diversion refers to the reduction in the volume of imports that PTA members source from non-members. By contrast, in our model, the formation of a PTA reduces the volume of exports of member countries to the non-member -a phenomenon we refer to as external trade diversion. Indeed, such trade diversion is precisely what makes it optimal for the non-member to reduce its tari¤s on PTA members. 5 To the best of our knowledge, our model is the …rst to capture the e¤ects of such external trade diversion on the import tari¤s of the non-member country and the associated welfare implications of such a change, issues that cannot be addressed by models that take the tari¤s of non-members to be exogenously given or assume a trading structure under which PTA formation does not a¤ect them. 3 By contrast, existing literature has tended to focus on how the formation of a PTA can induce member countries to reduce their external tari¤s. See Bagwell and Staiger (1997a , 1997b , Bond et al. (2004) , and Estevadeordal et al. (2008) . 4 See also Coates and Ludema (2001) for a theory of trade policy leadership based on repeated interaction between a large and a small country. In their model, a large country can undertake unilateral liberalization in order to induce reciprocal trade liberalization by the small country. 5 In our model, this logic would also apply to unilateral liberalization by any country so long as it is preferential in nature (i.e. extended only to one country). 6 See, for example, Bagwell and Staiger (1997a , 1997b , 1998 , Krishna (1998) , Ornelas (2005a and To isolate the market power e¤ect of a CU from their relative lack of ‡exibility, in section 4.1 we also consider a scenario where CU members are not allowed to raise their tari¤s above pre-existing levels. This experiment is well motivated on policy grounds: Article XXIV of GATT -the key clause that sanctions PTAs in the WTO -forbids member countries of a PTA from raising tari¤s on non-members. When CUs are constrained in this manner, we …nd that a bilateral CU continues to arise in the CPNE of the CU game thereby thwarting global free trade. This …nding implies that while the restriction on external tari¤s mandated by Article XXIV softens the negative impact of a CU on outsiders, it does not eliminate the exclusion incentive that gives rise to a CU in the …rst place. Thus, it is the relative ‡exibility of FTAs over CUs that helps the prospects of global free trade and not their weaker market power.
While the present paper follows the analytical approach of Saggi and Yildiz (2010) and Saggi et al. (2013) , it highlights an important conceptual di¤erence between the two types of PTAs that has not been explored in these papers (or in the rest of the literature on PTAs). More speci…cally, the conceptual point that the relative in ‡exibility of a CU makes it coalitionally more stable than an FTA has never really been explicitly proven in the literature since most existing papers generally focus on only one type of a PTA.
Unlike the present paper, both Saggi and Yildiz (2010) and Saggi et al. (2013) analyze PTA formation in a competing exporters model of trade in which each country imports the same good from two other countries. Both of these papers primarily focus on the issue of whether PTAs are building or stumbling blocs for free trade by comparing outcomes of two games -one where discriminatory PTAs are allowed and another where only nondiscriminatory multilateral agreements are permitted. This is not an issue that we address here. Saggi and Yildiz (2010) focus on FTAs and …nd that in their competing exporters framework, no two countries have an incentive to exclude the third country from their mutual trade liberalization. In their model, under symmetry the outcome is global free trade whereas under asymmetry the outcome is an agreement between the two larger countries not because they wish to exclude the third country but rather because the third country chooses to stay out on its own accord. In other words, the exclusion incentive never arises in Saggi and Yildiz (2010) . By contrast, when the model in the present paper is extended to an asymmetric setting, even in the FTA game the two larger countries deliberately choose to exclude the smaller country even though it would be better o¤ being included in the 2005b), and Saggi and Yildiz (2010) . In general, the literature has tended to focus on the reduction of market access experienced by non-members due to the formation of a PTA. agreement. A major real world concern regarding FTAs has always been whether they can become devices for exclusion. By allowing for endogenous agreements between all players, our paper demonstrates that this concern regarding FTAs and exclusion is a real one.
The CU game analyzed by Saggi et al. (2013) in a competing exporters model of trade delivers free trade under symmetry. By contrast, in the present paper, the outcome of the CU game even under symmetry is a bilateral CU. Furthermore, the present paper shows that the exclusion incentive of a CU exists even when its members are not allowed to fully exercise their market power by raising their tari¤s above preexisting levels. This result shows that it is the relative lack of ‡exibility of CUs relative to FTAs that prevents the obtainment of global free trade in the CU game, as opposed to their higher market power. Finally, note that though the exclusion incentive plays a role in the CU game of Saggi et al. (2013) when countries are asymmetric, the magnitude of this incentive is quite di¤erent in the present paper: in our competing importers framework, the reduction in the external tari¤ of the non-member induced by external trade diversion reinforces the exclusion incentive whereas no such e¤ect arises in a competing exporters framework.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.1 examines the CU game under the restriction that CU members cannot raise their tari¤ above preexisting levels. In section 4.2, we consider a game where countries can choose between the two types of PTAs and show that the unique CPNE of this game delivers a bilateral CU. In section 4.3, we show that this basic insight holds even when countries are not fully symmetric. Section 5 contains concluding remarks.
Tari¤s and trade
Our underlying economic framework is an adapted version of the two-country model of Horn et al. (2010) . We consider a perfectly competitive world with three large countries: z = i; j; and k and three (non-numeraire) goods: g = I, J, and K and a numeraire good v 0 . On the demand side, the representative citizen's utility function is linear in the numeraire good and separable in the non-numeraire goods:
where v = [v I ; v J ; v K ] is the consumption vector for the three non-numeraire goods, v 0 denotes the consumption of the numeraire good, and u(v) is quadratic and additively separable in the three non-numeraire goods. The demand for good g in country z is then given by
where p g z denotes the consumer price of good g in country z. Assuming that the population in each country is a continuum of measure one, we can write the consumer surplus associated with good g in country z as:
On the supply side, as in Horn et al. (2010) , labour (l) is the only factor of production which is employed in the production of the numeraire good that is produced one-for-one from labor. The supply of labor is assumed to be large enough that the numeraire good is always produced in a positive amount; therefore the equilibrium wage is equal to one.
Each non-numeraire good is produced from labor with diminishing returns. In particular, we assume the following production function for non-numeraire good g in country
z is the production of good g in country z and l g is the labor employed in the production of good g. The supply function of good g in country z is as follows:
wherez denotes the producer price for good g in country z. We assume that there exists a symmetric comparative advantage structure across countries:
In other words, each country has a comparative advantage in one good while having a comparative disadvantage in the other two: each country exports the good that is indexed by the same uppercase letter as the identity of the country. For example, country i exports good I while importing good J from country j and good K from country k. Thus, there are two competing importers for each non-numeraire good and the model is Ricardian in nature with diminishing returns in the production of each good. Country z's producer surplus in good g as follows:
As a representative scenario for all goods and countries, consider good I (i.e. the good in which country i is has a comparative advantage). Let t ji be the tari¤ imposed by country j on its imports of good I from country i. 7 Given that all countries are large, the world 7 We assume that tari¤ revenues for each good are redistributed unifomly to all individuals.
price of good I depends on the tari¤s chosen by countries j and k but to simplify notation we suppress the dependence of prices on tari¤s and simply denote the price of good I by
Due to the absence of any tari¤ in country i on good I, the consumer and producer prices of good I in country i are equal: q 
Similarly, let x I j and x I k denote country i's exports (of good I) to countries j and k where
and
Market clearing for good I requires that country i's exports to a country equals the imports of that country:
Before proceeding with the derivation of optimal tari¤s, it is useful to highlight some important features of the model. Since each country exports a unique good in the model, a country's tari¤ on one of its trading partners has no impact on the volume of its imports from its second trading partner. This implies that a country's external tari¤s are independent of one another (since they apply to di¤erent goods, each with its own demand function). 8 Second, if two countries liberalize trade only towards one another, they import more from each other and start exporting less to the third country -a phenomenon which we call external trade diversion. As we will see below, this reduction in the volume of exports to the third country in turn has implications for its optimal tari¤s.
Optimal Nash tari¤s
Country z's welfare is de…ned as the sum of consumer surplus, producer surplus, and tari¤ revenue over all goods:
where H corresponds to the good exported by country h.
In the absence of any trade agreement, each country chooses its tari¤s to maximize its welfare. To derive optimal tari¤s, we follow the approach of Feenstra (2004) Consider country k's tari¤ problem. Di¤erentiating w k with respect to t ki , we obtain:
The …rst term of the above …rst order condition is the e¢ ciency cost of the tari¤ (i.e. the marginal deadweight loss from the tari¤) while the second term is the terms of trade e¤ect, that is, the reduction in the price of good i that accrues to country i (p The optimal ad-valorem tari¤ is computed where (12) equals zero:
The above expression can be interpreted in two di¤erent ways. Note …rst that since m
we must have @m
Substituting this into (13) shows that country k's optimal ad-valorem tari¤ equals the inverse of the elasticity of the export supply curve of country i to country k, denoted by
For an alternative interpretation of the optimal tari¤, we can rearrange (13) and write the optimal tari¤ formula for country k as follows:
As can be seen from above, the optimal tari¤ is also equal to the inverse of the elasticity of import demand of good I in k ( I k ), times the ratio of the change in the relative world price and domestic price of imports. Given that import demand elasticity I k < 0, the fact that country k's tari¤ on good I drives down the local price of the good in country i (i.e. Using the demand and supply functions in equations (2) and (4) as well as equations (6) through (10), the equilibrium prices of good I in country i and in importing country j equal:
As is clear from equation (16) , the price of good I in country i decreases in the degree of comparative advantage (supply e¤ect) and the tari¤s it faces in export markets (terms of trade e¤ect). Similarly, the prices of good I in country j increases with its own tari¤ whereas it decreases with the tari¤ of the rival importer (i.e. country k). Using the above price equations, we can explicitly calculate the terms of trade gain and the pass through of import tari¤s. 10 We have: @p
i.e. the tari¤s imposed by countries j and k lower the price collected by country i's exporters and @p
i.e. the pass through from tari¤s to local prices in importing countries is incomplete -i.e.
the local price in a country does not increase one-to-one with its import tari¤.
The …rst order condition in (12) can be written as:
It is immediate from the above …rst order condition that we have positively sloped reaction functions, i.e., tari¤s imposed by di¤erent countries on the same good (i.e. their common import) are strategic complements in our model:
The intuition for why tari¤s of di¤erent countries end up being strategic complements in our model is easy to see: an increase in the tari¤ country j imposes on country i increases the volume of country i's exports to country k thereby increasing the latter's ability to manipulate its terms of trade. Simultaneous solution of …rst order conditions for countries j and k leads to the following optimal Nash tari¤s (which are equal due to symmetry):
How PTA formation a¤ects tari¤s
If countries i and j form an FTA hiji, they remove their tari¤s on each other (t ij = t ji = 0) and impose their individually optimal external tari¤s on the non-member country by solving:
Since member countries i and j are competing importers of good K, the elimination of their internal tari¤s due to the FTA has no impact on their tari¤s on imports of good K and thus the optimal external tari¤ of FTA members, denoted by t(ij), is the same as that under no agreement, denoted by t . We have t(ij) = t .
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On the other hand, since countries compete over imports, the formation of an FTA between two countries changes the …rst order conditions of the tari¤ choice problem of the non-member country. We have:
Since we know from (20) that tari¤s on the same good imposed by di¤erent importers are strategic complements, the reduction of t ij and t ji to zero induces country k to lower its external tari¤ on the imports from country i and country j. We have:
We can now state:
The external trade diversion caused by a bilateral FTA induces the non-member to lower its tari¤s on members (i.e. t k (ij) < t ) while it has no e¤ect on the external tari¤s of members (i.e. t(ij) = t ).
The general intuition behind the above proposition is as follows. Since the removal of internal tari¤s under the FTA hiji leads to an increase in the imports of country j from country i, the export supply curve of country i to country k shifts to the left. As a result, the equilibrium world price of good I rises while the equilibrium exports of country i to country k decline. Since export supply curves are linear in our model, the elasticity of export supply curves of countries i and j facing country k rises due to the formation of the bilateral FTA hiji:
which in turn implies that country k's optimal tari¤ on imports from countries i and j under the FTA hiji is lower than its optimal Nash tari¤ t . For an alternative interpretation of Proposition 1A, consider the optimal tari¤ formula in (15) . Note that the FTA hiji leads to an upward movement along the import demand curves of country k for goods i and j leading to a higher elasticity of import demand (common due to symmetry). Thus, the removal of the internal tari¤s under the FTA hiji leads to a lower terms of trade gain and a higher tari¤ pass through in country k:
both of which tend to lower its optimal tari¤. Analogous reasoning explains why the two spoke countries end up imposing lower tari¤s on each other relative to the status quo:
under the hub and spoke arrangement, each spoke exports more to the hub and less to the other spoke relative to the status quo, which in turn lowers the ability of both spokes to manipulate their terms of trade vis-à-vis one another.
Next, we consider the formation of a CU between countries i and j, denoted by hij u i. Like FTA members, CU members remove tari¤s on each other. However, unlike FTA members, CU members impose a jointly optimal external tari¤ on the non-member. Under the CU hij u i members solve:
As the common market of a CU is larger than that of its members, the combined market power of the CU exceeds that of the individual member countries. Since the terms-of-trade externalities across members are internalized by a CU and tari¤s on the same good across countries are complementary in our model, the optimum external tari¤s of members rise following the formation of CU.
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To gain further insight, let m K be the total import demand of good K in countries i and j:
while x K denote the exports of good K (from country k) to the common market of countries i and j:
The equilibrium world price of good K is determined by the market clearing condition:
Using the market clearing prices and quantities, the …rst order condition for the welfare maximization problem in (25) can be written as:
12 Olarreaga et al. (1999) provide evidence that the terms-of-trade externalities among Mercosur's members were internalized in its external tari¤s. 13 Note that with a CU we are back to two country set-up of Feenstra (1994) and Broda et al. (2008) .
Solving this yields the optimal tari¤ of the CU hij u i:
Since both countries import the same good from the non-member country, the market power e¤ect of a CU emphasized by Bagwell and Staiger (1997a) arises here. A CU allows members to pool their market power and extract a larger terms of trade gain from the non-member leading to an increase in their tari¤s:
It is also immediate that since member countries reduce their internal tari¤s to zero, like an FTA, a bilateral CU also induces the non-member to lower its tari¤s on members (and exactly to the same level):
It is straightforward to establish that the external trade diversion caused by a CU has qualitative similar e¤ects as an FTA:
The formation of a CU induces members to raise their external tari¤s (i.e. t(ij u ) > t ) and the non-member to lower them:
To see the general picture behind the above result more clearly, suppose that we start with the status quo where all countries impose the optimal tari¤ t on each other. It is obvious that the export supply of country k to the CU's common market lies to the right of its individual export supply curves to the markets of countries i and j since it applies to a common larger market. Similarly, following the formation of the CU hij u i, the common import demand of member countries is larger relative to individual import demands. Therefore, market clearing under the CU hij u i occurs at a lower p K k =x K k ratio relative to the status quo. Since export supply curves are linear, the elasticity of country k's export supply curve falls due to the formation of the CU hij u i. As a result, the optimal common external tari¤ under CU hij u i is higher than the individually optimal tari¤s of countries i and j.
It is worth noting that Article XXIV of GATT requires PTA members to not raise their external tari¤s on non-member countries. For now, we ignore this tari¤ restriction imposed 14 It is straightforward to con…rm that the optimal ad-valorem tari¤ of the CU equals the inverse of the elasticity of country k's export supply curve: t=p
. 15 Thus, Proposition 1 holds regardless of whether the PTA is an FTA or a CU.
by Article XXIV and assume that a CU can impose its optimal tari¤s. In section 4.1, we examine the implications of this tari¤ restriction on welfare and on the prospects of global free trade.
Endogenous preferential trade agreements
We now describe our three stage game of trade liberalization. In the …rst stage, each country simultaneously announces the names of countries with whom it wants to sign a PTA. This stage determines the underlying trade policy regime. Next, given the trade policy regime, countries choose their optimal tari¤s. Finally, consumption, production and international trade take place. As noted before, a key di¤erence between the two types of PTAs is the relative ‡exibility of FTAs: while an FTA member is free to sign another FTA with a non-member without needing consent of an existing FTA partner, a CU member cannot do so since all CU members must have a common external tari¤. To capture the implications of this important di¤erence between an FTA and a CU, we now derive and compare the equilibrium outcomes of the two games.
Free trade agreements
In the …rst stage of the FTA game, each country simultaneously announces the names of countries with whom it wants to sign an FTA. Country i's announcement is denoted by i and its strategy set S i consists of four possible announcements: S i = ff ; g; fj; g; f ; kg; fj; kgg where f ; g denotes an announcement in favor of no FTA with either trading partners, fj; g in favor of an FTA with only country j; f ; kg in favor of an FTA with only country k; and fj; kg in favor of FTAs with both of them.
It is important to note that we employ a game of announcements or proposals. In our game, a country does not announce in favor of a speci…c trade agreement but rather names partners with whom it wants to form such agreements. Furthermore, since a trade agreement requires consent from both sides, we posit the following mapping between various announcements pro…les and the types of trade agreements that countries can form:
(i) No two announcements match or the only matching announcements are f ; g. All of these announcement pro…les lead to no agreement h i wherein all countries impose their optimal Nash tari¤s on one another.
(ii) Two countries announce each others' name and there is no other matching announcement: i.e., the following three conditions hold: (a) j 2 i and i 2 j ; (b) i = 2 k and/or k = 2 i and (c) j = 2 k and/or k = 2 j . All announcements satisfying these three conditions yield an FTA between countries i and j denoted by hiji under which members impose zero tari¤s on each other and the optimal external tari¤ t on the non-member.
(iii) Country i announces in favor of signing an FTA with countries j and k while countries j and/or k announce only in favor of signing an FTA with country i: i.e. i = fj; kg; i 2 j ; and i 2 k while k = 2 j and/or j = 2 k . This set of announcements yields a pair of independent FTAs (i.e. a hub and spoke trading regime) with i as the common member denoted by hij; iki (or simply hihi) under which countries j and k impose the optimal external tari¤ on each other while imposing no tari¤s on country i who also imposes no tari¤s on either of them.
(iv) All countries announce each others'names. These announcements yield global free trade hF i under which all countries eliminate their tari¤s on each other. 16 Note that since an FTA between two countries can arise only if it is mutually acceptable to both sides, multiple announcement pro…les can map into the same agreement. For example, the FTA hiji obtains when (i) countries i and j call only each other, regardless of the nature of country k's announcement: if i = fj; g and j = fi; g, then hiji obtains for all four possible announcements on the part of country k, i.e., for k = f ; g, fi; g, f ; jg and fi; jg so that country k's announcement has no bearing upon the outcome when neither of the other two countries'announces its name; (ii) countries i and j announce each other's name and either one or both of them also announce country k but country k does not reciprocate: i.e. all of the following types of announcements map into the FTA hiji:
(a) i = fj; kg and j = fi; g but i = 2 k or (b) i = fj; g and j = fi; kg but j = 2 k or (c) i = fj; kg and j = fi; kg but k = f ; g.
Welfare e¤ects of various trade agreements
Let country i's welfare as a function of the underlying trade agreement a be denoted by w i (a) and let w i (a b) denote the di¤erence between country i's welfare under trade agreements a and b: w i (a b) w i (a) w i (b). Also, let m denote a member country of the bilateral FTA hiji so that m = i or j:
We …rst state the following preliminary result that explains the welfare e¤ects of various types of trade agreements:
Lemma 1: Let m; e m = i; j denote member countries of the FTA hiji. The welfare impact of various types of trade agreements on members and non-members is as follows:
. Part (i) says that, given that there exists no trade agreement, a pair of countries have an incentive to form a bilateral FTA and the formation of such an FTA makes the non-member country worse-o¤. In our model, the formation of a bilateral FTA does not a¤ect the nonmember's producer surplus in export markets since external tari¤s of FTA members are the same as those under the status quo (i.e. t(ij) = t ). Furthermore, since the external trade diversion caused by an FTA lowers the non-member's ability to manipulate its terms of trade vis-à-vis member countries (which is re ‡ected, in turn, in its reduced external tari¤), the non-member is worse o¤ relative to the status quo. Since aggregate world welfare increases due to the trade liberalization undertaken by FTA member countries, it follows that the formation of an FTA makes member countries better o¤ at the expense of the non-member.
The result stated in part (ii) of Lemma 1 establishes the existence of an exclusion incentive since a pair of countries prefer a bilateral FTA to free trade. Furthermore, since world welfare under free trade is higher than that under a bilateral FTA, it follows that the non-member country is better o¤ under free trade relative to a bilateral FTA. The forces that give rise to the exclusion incentive can be understood as follows. Relative to free trade, each member country of an FTA has the ability to manipulate its terms of trade vis-à-vis the non-member while also being able to free ride on the terms of trade e¤ect of the non-member's tari¤ on its FTA partner. These bene…ts of exclusion are somewhat tempered by the fact that, relative to free trade, an FTA member faces positive tari¤s in the non-member's market (but recall that these tari¤s are lower than those under the status quo owing to the external trade diversion caused by the FTA). All in all, the two positive e¤ects of exclusion on FTA members dominate the negative e¤ect so that a pair of countries bene…t if they can successfully exclude the third country from their bilateral trade agreement.
Part (iii) says the welfare of a hub country is higher than that of the member of a single bilateral FTA whereas that of a spoke country is lower. It is important to note that, starting from a single FTA, the external trade diversion caused by the hub country's second FTA reduces the volume of exports ‡owing from the original non-member (who becomes a spoke) to the original member (who becomes the other spoke). This trade diversion reduces the original non member's ability to manipulate its terms of trade which shows up as a reduction in its optimal external tari¤.
Part (iv) simply says that it is better to be a spoke than to be a non-member facing a bilateral FTA. When the non-member country forms an FTA with one of the member countries, it not only obtains free access to the hub country's market but also faces lower tari¤s in the other spoke country due to external trade diversion. However, it also gives free access to its market to the hub country while keeping its tari¤ on the other spoke country unchanged. Overall, the former positive e¤ects dominates the latter negative e¤ect.
Finally, part (v) says that while each spoke country is better o¤ under free trade, the hub country is worse o¤. A comparison of hub country m's welfare under hmhi relative to hF i yields the following: (i) the hub country's producer surplus is equal under the two regimes since its producers face zero tari¤s under both regimes and are a¤orded no protection in the home market (ii) its domestic welfare is higher under hmhi relative to hF i since it bene…ts from the positive terms of trade e¤ects of tari¤s that the spokes impose on each other -indeed, it is able to import goods from both spokes at prices that are lower than those under free trade. As a result, the hub country is strictly better o¤ relative to free trade. To see why the spokes are worse o¤ relative to free trade, …rst note that aggregate global welfare is strictly higher under free trade. Given that the hub country is strictly better o¤ relative to free trade and the fact that the welfare of the two spokes is equal (due to symmetry), both spokes are worse o¤ relative to free trade.
Nash Equilibria of the FTA game
Using the welfare comparisons stated in Lemma 1, we can show that the Nash equilibria of the FTA game are as follows:
Proposition 2A: The Nash equilibrium announcement pro…les of the FTA game and the associated trade agreements are as follows:
Announcement Pro…les
Trade Agreement
The logic behind Proposition 2A is as follows. It is straightforward that the announcement pro…le is a Nash equilibrium since no country has an incentive to announce another's name if the latter does not announce its name in return. Next consider ij . Note from part (i) of Lemma 1 that neither member country (i or j) has an incentive to unilaterally change its announcement from that which it makes under ij since doing so only leads to no agreement h i, under which its welfare is lower. Similarly, given that neither country i nor country k announces its name, country k has no incentive to alter its announcement from k = f ; g since doing so has no bearing on the resulting trade agreement. Thus, the announcement pro…le ij yielding a bilateral FTA is a Nash equilibrium.
Now consider the announcement pro…le ih associated with the hub and spoke regime hihi. First note that the hub country i has no incentive to unilaterally change its announcement from fj; kg to fj; g or f ; kg since doing so translates into a deviation from the hub and spoke regime hihi where i is the hub country to hiji or hiki respectively. Similarly, the hub country has no incentive to alter its announcement to f ; g since doing so yields h i under which it is also worse o¤. Now consider the incentive of a spoke country to deviate from ih . Neither spoke country (say j) has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from its announcement fi; g to f ; g or fi; kg since the former deviation translates into a deviation from hihi where j is a spoke country to hiki where j is a non-member country while the latter deviation does not alter the trading regime, i.e., it remains hihi. As a result, neither the hub nor the spokes have an incentive to unilaterally alter their announcements from ih that yields the hub and spoke regime hihi.
Finally, consider the announcement pro…le F that yields global free trade hF i. Since world welfare is the highest under hF i, each country is better o¤ under hF i to h i and this preference together with part (ii) of Lemma 1 implies that a country (say k) has no incentive to unilaterally deviate from its announcement fi; jg to f ; g since doing so alters the trade regime from from hF i to hiji under which it is worse o¤. Moreover, we know from part (v) of Lemma 1 that a country (say k) has no incentive to unilaterally change its announcement from fi; jg to fi; g or f ; jg since this translates into a deviation from hF i to hihi or hjhi under both of which country k is a spoke country.
Thus,
F is also a Nash equilibrium.
Observe from Proposition 2A that there is a unique announcement pro…le that supports each agreement as a Nash equilibrium and that the pro…le itself is the most parsimonious one. For example, even though f i = f ; jg; j = f ; g; k = f ; gg also maps to h i, such an announcement pro…le does not constitute a Nash equilibrium. To see why, simply note that given these announcements, country j has an incentive to alter its announcement from j = f ; g to j = fi; g in order to form the bilateral FTA hiji. Similarly, it is worth considering brie ‡y as to why f i = fj; g; j = fi; g; k = fi; gg is not a Nash equilibrium pro…le even though, just as the announcement pro…le ij , it also maps into the FTA hiji. Under this announcement pro…le, given the announcements of countries j and k, as per part (iii) of Lemma 1, country i has an incentive to alter its announcement to i = fj; kg so as to obtain the trade agreement hiji under which it is the hub. Using analogous reasoning, we rule out all other non-parsimonious announcements as candidates for Nash equilibria in the Appendix.
It is worth noting that except for -which is Pareto dominated by the announcement ij cannot be Pareto ranked, observe from part (iii) of Lemma 1 that while country i is better o¤ under hihi relative to hiji, country j is worse o¤.
Coalition Proof Nash Equilibria
In what follows, we re…ne the set of Nash equilibria by isolating those Nash equilibria that are coalition proof. Bernheim et al. (1987) state that "in an important class of "noncooperative"environments, it is natural to assume that players can freely discuss their strategies, but cannot make binding commitments. In such cases, any meaningful agreement between the players must be self-enforcing. Although the Nash best-response property is a necessary condition for self-enforceability, it is not su¢ cient -it is in general possible for coalitions to arrange plausible, mutually bene…cial deviations from Nash agreements."
Allowing countries to discuss their strategies regarding which trade agreements they intend to form is eminently desirable in the present context since countries considering bilateral trade agreements certainly have the capacity to communicate with one another without necessarily having the ability to make binding commitments regarding their future plans. We are now ready to state one of our key results (see the appendix for its proof):
The only coalition proof Nash equilibrium of the FTA game is the announcement pro…le F that yields global free trade.
The key message of this result is that even though a pair of countries bene…t from excluding the third country from their trade agreement, they are unable to exercise this exclusion incentive in equilibrium. The ‡exible nature of FTAs plays a crucial role in ensuring that the exclusion incentive goes unexercised in the FTA game. To see why, suppose the announcement pro…le is F -i.e. each country announces in favor of an FTA with both its trading partners. Starting at F , as part (ii) of Lemma 1 indicates, two countries (say i and j) have an incentive to exclude the third country by jointly altering their announcements in way that the announcement pro…le changes from F to f i = fj; g; j = fi; g; k = fi; jgg thereby altering the associated trade regime from free trade to the bilateral FTA hiji.
However, from Lemma 1 we know that the most preferred trading arrangement from each country's perspective is a hub and spoke regime under which it is the hub. It follows then that, holding constant the announcement of the excluded country at k = fi; jg, each member of the deviating coalition has an incentive to alter its announcement to form a separate FTA with the excluded country. For example, country i has an incentive to alter its announcement from i = fj; g to i = fj; kg which alters the announcement pro…le from f i = fj; g; j = fi; g; k = fi; jgg to f i = fj; kg; j = fi; g; k = fi; jgg and the associated trade regime from hiji to hihi. Since the welfare of a hub is higher than that of a member country of a single FTA -see part (iii) of Lemma 1 -the original coalitional deviation of countries i and j from is not self-enforcing. Thus, in a nutshell, since it is better to be a (i) hub under a hub and spoke regime than to be a member of a single FTA and (ii) a spoke than to be a non-member facing a bilateral FTA, in the FTA game no two countries are able to successfully exclude the third country by forming a bilateral FTA: the lure of a hub and spoke trading arrangement ends up delivering free trade as the only CPNE of the FTA game.
It is important to acknowledge that when evaluating whether a particular coalitional deviation is self-enforcing or not, the concept of a CPNE holds the announcement of the excluded country constant. Thus, when country i alters its announcement from i = fj; g to i = fj; kg in order to secure the hub and spoke regime hihi, the CPNE concept rules out the possibility of a pact between countries j and k to enter into an FTA with each other.
Thus, by imposing this type of a restriction, the concept of a CPNE captures a relatively limited type of self-enforceability. Is such a restriction plausible in our model of FTAs? become public knowledge only after it has been rati…ed by member countries and the actual signing of an FTA by two countries is rather di¤erent from early negotiations between them, detailed information about which may not be easily available to outsiders.
An alternative way of understanding Proposition 3A is as follows. In our three player game, to isolate the CPNE of the FTA game we only need to consider coalitional deviations from each Nash equilibrium to other Nash equilibria since, by de…nition, any coalitional deviations from a Nash equilibrium announcement pro…le to other pro…les that are not Nash equilibria are susceptible to unilateral deviations on the part of at least one member of the deviating coalition and therefore do not need to be considered. A Nash equilibrium pro…le from which no coalition wishes to deviate to another Nash equilibrium pro…le would then be coalition proof. Using this logic, we can immediately rule out the announcement pro…le as a CPNE since countries i and j bene…t from a joint deviation to ij , which is a Nash equilibrium. Next, note that ij also cannot be coalition proof since parts (iii) and (iv) of Lemma 1 imply that countries i and k bene…t by jointly deviating to the Nash equilibrium pro…le ih . Furthermore, ih is also not coalition proof since, as per part (v) We now analyze the CU game.
The CU game
Suppose the PTA under consideration is a CU as opposed to an FTA. As under the FTA game, at the …rst stage of the CU formation game each country announces the names of countries with whom it wants to form a CU. Country i's announcement is denoted by i and its strategy set S iu consists of four possible announcements:
where f ; g denotes an announcement in favor of no CU with either trading partners, fj u ; g in favor of a CU with only country j; f ; k u g in favor of a CU with only country k;
and fj u ; k u g in favor of a CU that includes both its trading partners.
The mapping between various announcements pro…les and the CUs that can arise is as follows: (i) when no two announcements match or the only matching announcements are f ; g we obtain no agreement h i; (ii) a CU between countries i and j denoted by hij u i is formed if they announce each others'names and there is no other matching announcement, i.e., hij u i is formed if the following three conditions hold: (a) j u 2 i , i u 2 j and (b) k u = 2 i and/or i u = 2 k and (c) k u = 2 j and/or j u = 2 k ; (iv) free trade hF i obtains i¤ all countries announce each other's names. Recall that the equivalent of a hub and spoke trading regime cannot arise under the CU game due to the fact that CU members coordinate their external tari¤s. In order to derive Nash equilibria of the CU game, we …rst summarize the relevant welfare comparisons:
Lemma 2: Let m = i; j denote a member country of the CU hij u i. Then we have: (i) w k (ij u ) < 0 < w m (ij u ) and (ii) w m (ij u F ) > 0. Lemma 2 can be interpreted much like Lemma 1. Part (i) simply says that the formation of a CU makes members better o¤ and the non-member worse o¤. In fact, since CU members pool their market power and extract a larger terms of trade gain from the nonmember, the welfare of a CU member is higher than that of an FTA member while that of the non-member is lower:
Part (ii) of Lemma 2 says that the exclusion incentive is very much at play in the CU game. In fact, the exclusion incentive of a CU is stronger than that of an FTA, which is another implication of the higher market power of a CU:
Equilibria of the CU game
Proposition 2B: The Nash equilibrium announcement pro…les of the CU game and the associated trade agreements are as follows: (i) u f i = f ; g; j = f ; g; k = f ; gg which yields no agreement h i.
(ii) All announcement pro…les satisfying j u 2 i , i u 2 j and any one of the following three conditions yield the bilateral CU hij u i: (1) k u = 2 i and k u = 2 j or (2) k u = 2 i and
F u f i = fj u ; k u g; j = fi u ; k u g; k = fi u ; j u gg which yields global free trade hF i.
The logic underlying Proposition 2B follows directly from Lemma 2. The announcement pro…le F u is a Nash equilibrium since no country has an incentive to unilaterally alter its announcement because doing so results in free trade being replaced by a bilateral CU between the other two countries under which it is worse o¤. Furthermore, u is a Nash equilibrium since no country has an incentive to announce another's name given that the latter does not reciprocate. The key di¤erence relative to the FTA game is described in part (ii) of Proposition 2B. Note that as long as countries i and j announce each other's names but not that of country k, the resulting agreement is the bilateral CU hij u i regardless of what country k announces. When countries i and j announce each other's names and one of them announces country k but country k does not make any matching announcement, the resulting agreement is again hij u i. As such, a variety of di¤erent announcement pro…les are consistent with a bilateral CU. Following Lemma 2, hij u i is the most preferred trade regime of member countries. Therefore, neither country i nor j has an incentive to unilaterally change its announcement and a unilateral change in country k's announcement does not alter the existing trade agreement hij u i since a CU member cannot have an independent trade agreement with the third country due to the requirement of a common external tari¤.
Following our discussion of the FTA game, it is easy to see that u is not a CPNE of the CU game. To see why, simply note that starting at u , countries i and j bene…t by altering their announcements to i = fj; g and j = fi; g which converts no agreement h i to the bilateral CU hij u i under which both of them are better o¤ (see Lemma 2) . Since the announcement pro…le f i = fj; g; j = fi; g; k = f ; gg is a Nash equilibrium of the CU game, it is immune to unilateral deviations on the part of countries i and j.
We now argue that F u is also not a CPNE of the CU game. To see why, simply consider the coalitional deviation of countries i and j from f i = fj; g; j = fi; g; k = fi; jgg. Observe from Proposition 2B that this coalitional deviation alters the trade regime from free trade to hij u i and since CU members enjoy higher welfare than that under free trade, neither member country has an incentive to unilaterally alter its announcements from that which it makes under 1 u . The key di¤erence relative to the FTA game is that the joint deviation of countries i and j from each of them announcing both their trading partners names' to calling only each other is now self-enforcing since, holding constant country k's announcement, neither of them has an incentive to further deviate unilaterally.
Thus, F u fails to be a CPNE of the CU game. Thus, the only remaining candidate for a CPNE is the CU hij u i. To see why it must be a CPNE, simply note that, starting with any Nash equilibrium announcement pro…le that yields hij u i, member countries have no incentive to jointly alter their announcements to either obtain h i or hF i since they are worse o¤ under either of these outcomes. Furthermore, since at least one of the members does not announce the non-member's name in any announcement pro…le that supports hij u i, no coalition of a member and a non-member can obtain free trade by jointly altering their announcements. Thus, we can state the following:
Proposition 3B: Only those announcement pro…les that yield a bilateral CU constitute the coalition proof Nash equilibria of the CU game.
The di¤erence between results reported in Propositions 3A and 3B is driven by the relatively ‡exible nature of FTAs compared to CUs. In the FTA game, if two countries (i and j) try to jointly exclude the third country by forming a bilateral FTA then each of them has an incentive to sign an independent FTA with the excluded country thereby making itself a hub. The ability to act on this incentive acts as a deterrent for the other initially deviating country (say j) since it is worse o¤ as a spoke under hihi relative to free trade and thus the initial joint deviation from the announcement pro…le F to ij does not occur. However, unlike the FTA game, no such deterrent exists under the CU game since a CU member cannot form an independent agreement with the excluded country without the consent of its CU partner. Therefore, our model suggests that the pursuit of PTAs is compatible with the goal of achieving global free trade only when PTAs take the form of FTAs.
We should note here that our non-cooperative approach rules out transfers between countries. It is worth discussing brie ‡y the case where the use of such transfers is permitted.
Since joint welfare is maximized under global free trade, if international transfers could be freely used then the outcome of the CU game would also be free trade. In the real world, it is probably the case that countries can use transfers but they also face some constraints regarding how large such transfers can be. If this is the case, our analysis shows that while the FTA game would yield free trade, the CU game will fail to do so if the bene…t of the exclusion to two countries exceeds the maximum level of transfer that the non-member can provide to induce CU members to move to global free trade -i.e. free trade would not arise if the maximum level of the transfer that an excluded country can provide to each CU member to induce it to move to free trade falls below w m (ij u F ).
Further analysis and discussion
In what follows, motivated by Article XXIV of GATT, we …rst examine the consequences of restricting CU members from raising their external tari¤ above the pre-existing level t . 18 Next, holding this restriction in place, we analyze two di¤erent extensions. In the …rst extension, we analyze a more general game where countries can choose between FTAs and CUs. In the second extension, we consider a scenario where demand is asymmetric across countries in order to examine how allowing for such type of asymmetry alters our key results. 18 Part 5(a) of Article XXIV of GATT states that "with respect to a customs union, or an interim agreement leading to a formation of a customs union, the duties and other regulations of commerce imposed at the institution of any such union or interim agreement in respect of trade with contracting parties not parties to such union or agreement shall not on the whole be higher or more restrictive than the general incidence of the duties and regulations of commerce applicable in the constituent territories prior to the formation of such union."
Article XXIV restriction on external tari¤s
We now isolate the implications of the pooling of market power under a CU from its relative in ‡exibility compared to an FTA. We do this by holding the external tari¤ of the CU constant at the pre-existing level t . This is well motivated experiment since the key WTO clause that sanctions PTAs, i.e. Article XXIV of GATT, forbids member countries of a PTA from raising tari¤s on non-members. In our model, in the absence of such a restriction, CU members indeed raise their tari¤s on outsiders due to the pooling of their market power whereas FTA members do not. What is the equilibrium outcome of the CU game when CU members are unable to raise their tari¤s above the levels that prevail in the absence of any trade agreements? 19 If CU members are prohibited from raising tari¤s on non-members, the external tari¤s under a CU and FTA are equal:
Given that they impose equal external tari¤s and face the same tari¤s in export markets, the welfare levels of a CU member is the same as that as an FTA member:
for m = i; j. It turns out that countries i and j still have an incentive to jointly deviate from their respective announcements fj; kg and fi; kg to the announcements fj; g and fi; g (converting free trade hF i to a bilateral CU hij u i) even when the external tari¤s are restricted by Article XXIV:
As before, this deviation is self-enforcing and thus free trade fails to be coalition-proof under the restricted CU game. Thus, even when CU members are prevented from raising their tari¤s on outsiders, a bilateral CU still emerges in coalition-proof Nash equilibria of the CU game. The only consequence of the tari¤ restriction is that it reduces the external tari¤ of the CU. Thus, though the restriction on external tari¤s of CU members fails to further the cause of global free trade, it makes the resulting CU more attractive from a global welfare perspective by softening the adverse impact of the CU on the non-member country. 20 Hereafter, we assume that a CU must abide by the external tari¤ restriction imposed by GATT Article XXIV. A useful implication of abiding by GATT Article XXIV in our model is that the welfare of members of a CU becomes equal to that of FTA members (since their external tari¤s become equal and internal tari¤s are zero in both cases). As a result, the two types of PTAs di¤er from one another only in terms of the ‡exibility available to members
The choice between FTAs and CUs
Thus far, we have required countries to form either FTAs or CUs without allowing them to pick between the two. What if both types of PTAs were permitted simultaneously in the same game? To address this question, consider the following PTA game. In the …rst stage, each country simultaneously announces the names of countries with whom it wants to sign a PTA as well as the nature of the PTA it seeks. For an agreement to arise between two countries, they need to not only announce each other's names but also call in favor of the same type of PTA (i.e. an FTA or a CU).
Country i's strategy set i consists of seven possible announcements: i = ff ; g; fj; g; fj u ; g; f ; kg; f ; k u g; fj; kg; fj u ; k u gg where f ; g denotes an announcement in favor of no FTA or CU with either trading partners, fj; g in favor of an FTA with only country j; fj u ; g in favor of a CU with country j;f ; kg in favor of an FTA with only country k; f ; k u g in favor of a CU with country k; fj; kg in favor of FTAs with both of them and fj u ; k u g in favor of a CU that includes all three countries which is tantamount to announcing in favor of global free trade.
Here, it is important to re-emphasize that, due to the common external tari¤ requirement of a CU, a country cannot announce in favor of (i) two independent CUs with its trading partners or (ii) in favor of a bilateral CU and a bilateral FTA simultaneously. Finally, note that announcing fj u ; k u g is not equivalent to announcing in favor of a bilateral CU with either partner. The mapping between announcements and trade agreements in the extended PTA game follows naturally from our previous two games. To avoid redundancy, we simply note two novel aspects of the mapping between announcements and agreements in the extended game. First, no agreement h i obtains in the PTA game whenever no announcements match or the only matching announcements are f ; g where two announcements can fail to match just because two countries desire a di¤erent type of a PTA with each other. For example, no agreement h i obtains when i = fj; g; j = fi u ; g; and k = f'; g. In this case, although countries i and j announce each other's names, country i calls in favor of an FTA whereas country j announces in favor of a CU. No agreement obtains because countries i and j call in favor of di¤erent types of PTAs with each other and neither of them calls country k. The second point to note about the PTA game is that both of the following announcements map into global free trade: f i = fj; kg; j = fi; kg; k = fi; jgg and f i = fj u ; k u g; j = fi u ; k u g; k = fi u ; j u gg. In other words, if all countries announce in favor of the same type of PTA with both their trading partners, the resulting outcome is free trade regardless of whether the PTA is an FTA or a CU. Other than these two aspects, the mappings between various announcements and trade agreements described in the FTA game and the CU game carry over naturally to the PTA game. Combining the proofs of Propositions 2 and 4, we …rst argue that free trade does not arise in the CPNE of the PTA game. As before, it is immediate that countries i and j have an incentive to coalitionally deviate from their free trade announcements to the announcements fj u ; g and fi u ; g (thereby converting hF i to hij u i) and it is a selfenforcing deviation since, taking country k's announcement as …xed at fi u ; j u g, neither of them has an incentive to further deviate unilaterally.
It is straightforward from part (i) of Lemmas 1 and 2 that h i is not a CPNE since a pair of countries have an incentive to coalitionally deviate in order to form an FTA or a CU and such a joint deviation is self-enforcing. It is immediate from the inequalities reported in parts (iii) and (iv) of Lemma 1 that a member country and the non-member country facing a bilateral FTA have an incentive to engage in a coalitional deviation that would convert the FTA to a hub and spoke regime. Furthermore, this initial coalitional deviation is self-enforcing since no proper subset of the initially deviating countries has an incentive to further alter its announcement unilaterally. Therefore, announcement pro…les that yield a bilateral FTA are not a CPNE of the PTA game.
Next, we show that a hub and spoke regime such as hihi also does not arise in the CPNE of the PTA game. Note from the inequality in part (v) of Lemma 1 that two spoke countries have incentives to coalitionally change their announcements, converting a hub and spoke regime to free trade. This initial coalitional deviation is self-enforcing since the announcement pro…le supporting free trade is a Nash equilibrium. Therefore, hihi cannot arise in a CPNE. Finally, since member countries under a bilateral CU obtain the highest possible individual welfare, they have no incentive to unilaterally or coalitionally deviate, and thus, only those announcement pro…les that yield hij u i constitute a CPNE.
Based on our previous discussions of the FTA game and CU game, it is clear then that when countries are free to choose between the two types of PTAs, the CPNE of the PTA game yield hij u i. One way of interpreting this result is that if the CU game is expanded to allow additional strategies that allow players to call in favor of an FTA, the result stated in Proposition 3B remains una¤ected. This …nding further supports the intuitive idea underlying the paper -i.e. owing to its relatively in ‡exible nature, a CU is a more coalitionally stable agreement compared to an FTA. However, it also seems fair to acknowledge that, while our model does a nice job of capturing this fundamental di¤erence between FTAs and CUs, we do not think that the PTA game analyzed above captures some important real-world factors that are likely to determine the choice between FTAs and CUs.
For example, by design, the model abstracts from the di¢ culties that actual CU members face in reaching agreement on and then enforcing a common external tari¤. Similarly, the sharing of tari¤ revenue among CU members does not occur as seamlessly in the real world as is assumed in the model. Finally, the underlying trading structure assumed by us is one in which the exclusion incentive of a CU ends up driving equilibrium outcomes. While such an incentive is likely to arise in other trading structures, its magnitude may not be large enough to yield a CU as an equilibrium outcome. For example, in the competing exporters framework of Saggi et al. (2013) , the exclusion incentive of a CU is weaker and the equilibrium outcome of the CU game is global free trade.
Implications of asymmetry: an illustration
Thus far, we have assumed that countries are symmetric in every respect except for the fact that each country has a comparative advantage in a unique good. It is natural to wonder whether our key results extend to a setting where countries di¤er from one another in some respect. To gain some insight into how asymmetry might matter, it proves instructive to focus on the following case: suppose two countries (denoted by l and l 0 ) have larger market demands than the third (denoted by s). More speci…cally, let the pattern of demand asymmetry be captured by the demand intercept (see equation 2) in the following fashion:
In order to guarantee interior solutions to the optimal tari¤ problems of all countries, we assume that < ( ) = 1 + =4.
How does a country's incentive to form a bilateral PTA with another depend on the distribution of market sizes across countries? We address this key question in the following lemma:
Lemma 3: Let country j be a PTA partner of country i under regime r but not regime v, where r; v = h i, hiji, hij u i ; hihi or hF i and r 6 = v: Then, the following holds:
First, observe that the countries with larger markets have greater market power, and therefore gain more from their optimal tari¤s than the smaller country. The intuition underlying the
< 0 is as follows. Due to the smaller volume of their exports, countries with larger markets bene…t less from tari¤ reductions granted by the smaller country. Similarly, larger countries have relatively more to lose from eliminating their own optimal tari¤s since these tari¤s apply to relatively larger import volumes (or to relatively inelastic export supply curves). Thus, a country's willingness to enter into a bilateral trade agreement with another depends negatively on its own market size.
A similar intuition underlies the other inequality (i.e.
The larger the market size of a country's partner, the larger the increase in its export surplus from the elimination of its partner's optimal tari¤ and the smaller the loss due to its own trade liberalization since the tari¤ reduction applies to a smaller volume of imports (due to the larger market size of its partner). The two inequalities reported in Lemma 3 imply that a country prefers to form a bilateral PTA with the larger of its two trading partners:
Let i (r v) denote the critical threshold of market size asymmetry at which country i is indi¤erent between regimes r and v so that w i (r v) = 0. For example, consider the following two regimes: hll 0 i and hlhi from the perspective of countries s and l. Using the above lemma, we know that (i)
We know from the discussion under symmetry that a country prefers being a spoke to being a non-member facing an FTA ( w s (lh ll 0 ) > 0). As country s becomes smaller in size relative to the other two countries, using (i) we can show that w s (lh ll 0 ) > 0 for all -i.e. the result that it is better to be a spoke than to be an outsider extends to the asymmetric setting for the smaller country. Furthermore, there exists a critical threshold of market size asymmetry ( l (lh ll 0 )) at which country l is indi¤erent between regimes hll 0 i and hlhi. Recall that under symmetry a country prefers being a hub to being a member under an FTA. Using
(ii), we can show that the incentive to become a hub decreases as country s becomes smaller in size relative to the other two countries. At the limit when = ( ), we have w l (lh ll 0 ) < 0 and thus it follows that country l prefers hll 0 i to hlhi when > l (lh ll 0 ).
Using this logic and utilizing the results under symmetry as well as Lemma 3, we prove the following proposition, illustrated in …gure 1, in the appendix:
Proposition 4: Let s = 1 < l = l 0 = < ( ). Then, the following hold: (i) FTA game: When < (mh ll 0 ) for m = l; l 0 , the strategy pro…le that yields global free trade hF i is the unique CPNE of the FTA game whereas when > (mh ll 0 )
those announcement pro…les that yield the bilateral FTA between the two larger countries hll 0 i constitute the set of CPNE.
21
(ii) CU game: Only those announcement pro…les that yield the bilateral CU between the two larger countries hll 0 u i constitute the CPNE of the CU game.
22
Insert Figure 1 The has an incentive to alter its announcement from l = fl 0 ; g to l = fl; sg so as to obtain the hub and spoke arrangement hlhi. Thus the result stated in Proposition 3A does not require symmetry; it continues to hold as long as the degree of demand asymmetry between countries is not too pronounced.
When the market size of two larger countries is su¢ ciently large relative to the smaller country (i.e. > l (lh ll 0 )), the degree of external trade diversion caused by the bilateral FTA hll 0 i is high and this tends to lower the optimal tari¤s of the smaller country. 21 All strategy pro…les with the following two properties yield hll 0 i: (i ) l 2 l 0 and l 0 2 l and (ii ) s = 2 l and s = 2 l 0 . 22 All strategy pro…les with the following two properties yield hll The analysis above shows that the lure of a hub and spoke arrangement that undermines a bilateral FTA is not as strong when the excluded country is su¢ ciently small relative to the other two countries. This is a fairly intuitive result and it provides useful perspective on when and why the pursuit of bilateral FTAs does not necessarily end up in global free trade. It also …ts well with related existing literature that generally …nds free trade to be more likely to obtain when countries are relatively symmetric to one another.
Conclusion
At a time when multilateral trade liberalization at the WTO seems to have come to a grinding halt, the question whether PTAs have a useful role to play in the global trading system seems to have acquired a greater degree of urgency. After all, other than unilateral trade liberalization, over the last decade or so PTAs appear to be the only game in town for countries interested in undertaking reciprocal trade liberalization. Of course, the concern that the pursuit of PTAs might undermine whatever appetite remains in the global trading system for multilateral trade liberalization remains a real one.
In this paper, we attempt to isolate the implications of the two commonly occurring PTAs, i.e. FTAs and CUs, for the prospects of global free trade. The starting point of our analysis is a well understood di¤erence between these two types of PTAs: while CU members impose common external tari¤s, FTA members are free to implement external tari¤s of own choosing. This di¤erence in tari¤ setting behavior between the two PTAs implies that while FTA members have less market power than CU members, they enjoy a greater degree of ‡exibility in the sense that they are free to enter into further trade agreements with outsiders whereas CU members can only do so with consent of existing members.
An important result of this paper is that the formation of either type of PTA induces the non-member to lower its tari¤s on PTA members: the external trade diversion -i.e. the reduction in the volume of exports ‡owing from PTA members to the non-membersreduces the ability of the non-member to manipulate its terms of trade thereby making it optimal for it to lower its tari¤s. Thus, PTA formation not only bene…ts members because of the internal trade liberalization that they undertake but also because of the external trade liberalization induced abroad.
The central result of the paper is that the more ‡exible nature of FTAs (which in turn emanates from independent external tari¤ setting on the part of FTA members) helps in the attainment of global free trade. Speci…cally, in the CPNE of the FTA game, each country ends up entering into FTAs with both its trading partners, an outcome under which all countries impose zero tari¤s on each other. By contrast, a bilateral CU is the outcome of all announcement pro…les that constitute the CPNE of the CU game. We show that this result holds even when demand, and therefore market power, is asymmetric across countries. This result captures the intuition that, once formed, CUs constrain their members in a way that FTAs do not. Finally, we also …nd that the tari¤ restriction imposed by Article XXIV of the GATT fails to further the cause of global free trade although it makes the resulting CU more attractive from a global welfare perspective. Thus, our model shows that while the two key attributes of a CU -i.e. the pooling of market power by its members and the inability of any one member to enter into independent trade agreements with outsiders -both impose welfare costs on the world trading system, the latter is a more important obstacle in path of global free trade.
Finally, optimal tari¤s under each trade regime are given by: 
Note that t sl (ll 0 ) = t sl (l 0 h) 0 only when < ( ) = 1+ =4. Using the above formulae and the optimal tari¤ levels reported in the text, we can easily calculate welfare levels under all possible trade agreements for both cases of symmetry and asymmetry. To save space, we do not include the algebraic details underlying these straightforward calculations. The proofs of Lemmas 1-3 follow immediately from these welfare comparisons.
Proof of Proposition 2A
In the text, we showed that parsimonious announcement pro…les leading to h i, hiji, and hihi are Nash equilibria of the FTA game. We next consider non-parsimonious announcement pro…les and show that these are not Nash equilibria.
First note that, in any non-parsimonious announcement pro…le leading to no agreement h i, it must be the case that countries' announcements do not match with each other. Under such a case, since countries always bene…t from FTA formation (from Lemma 1), a country whose name is announced has an incentive to unilaterally change its announcement, leading to a bilateral FTA. Therefore, any non-parsimonious announcement pro…le that leads to h i cannot be a Nash equilibrium. Now consider the non-parsimonious announcement pro…les leading to a bilateral FTA hiji. First, consider the following scenario: i = fj; g and j = fi; g while k = fi; g or f ; jg or fi; jg. Under such a case, depending on country k's announcement, either country i or country j has an incentive to unilaterally change its announcement to include k in order to become a hub under a hub and spoke regime. Second, suppose (a) i = fj; kg and j = fi; g but i = 2 k or (b) i = fj; g and j = fi; kg but j = 2 k or (c) i = fj; kg and j = fi; kg but i; j = 2 k . Under all three cases, since country k prefers being spoke to being a non-member under a bilateral FTA (from Lemma 1), it has an incentive to unilaterally change its announcement in order to become a spoke under a hub and spoke regime. As a result, any non-parsimonious announcement leading to a bilateral FTA hiji cannot be a Nash equilibrium.
Finally, suppose that i = fj; kg; j = fi; kg; k = fi; g or i = fj; kg; j = fi; g; k = fi; jg. Under both scenarios, the spoke country that does not announce the other spoke has an incentive to unilaterally change its announcement to also call the other spoke which leads to free trade hF i. Therefore, the initial announcement pro…les are not Nash equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2B
In the text, we showed that parsimonious announcement pro…le leading to h i is a Nash equilibrium of the CU game. We next consider non-parsimonious announcement pro…les and show that these are not Nash equilibria. As in the FTA game, in any non-parsimonious announcement pro…le leading to no agreement h i, it must be the case that countries' announcements do not match with each other. Under such a case, since countries always bene…t from CU formation (from Lemma 2), a country whose name is announced has an incentive to unilaterally change its announcement, leading to a bilateral CU. Therefore, any non-parsimonious announcement pro…le that leads to h i cannot be a Nash equilibrium.
Next, we show that the following announcement pro…le that yields a bilateral CU hij u i:
g is not a Nash equilibrium. Under such a case, since country k prefers free trade to being a non-member under hij u i (from Lemma 2), it has an incentive to unilaterally change its announcement from f ; g to fi u ; j u g that would convert hij u i to hF i.
Proof of Proposition 3A
We begin by considering whether the announcement pro…le F that leads to hF i is a CPNE. Since world welfare is the highest under hF i and countries have equal welfare due to symmetry, each country is better o¤ under hF i relative to h i and thus we can immediately rule out any coalitional announcement deviations that would lead to h i replacing hF i. Similarly, we know that no two countries (say j and k) have incentives to jointly alter their announcements from fi; kg to fi; g and fi; jg to fi; g, respectively since doing so would lead to a deviation from hF i to hihi where both become spokes (and spokes are worse of relative to free trade). Finally, taking the announcement of their complement (country k) as …xed, consider the joint deviation of two countries (say i and j) from their announcements fj; kg and fi; kg to fj; g and fi; g respectively. This joint deviation implies a coalitional deviation from hF i to hiji. From Lemma 1 part (ii) we know that w m (F ij) < 0. This implies that, taking the announcement of their complement (country k) …xed at k = fi; jg, the above coalitional deviation in announcements would occur. The question then becomes whether this joint deviation is self-enforcing. We next argue that it is not. This is because given that k = fi; jg, we know from Lemma 1 part (iii) that country i has an incentive to alter its announcement fj; g to fj; kg in order to create the trading regime hihi where it becomes the hub. Similarly, country j has an incentive to alter its announcement fi; g to fi; kg so as to itself become the hub. Thus, the initial coalitional deviation that can cause hF i to be replaced by hiji is not self-enforcing. As a result, the announcement pro…le F is a CPNE.
Next, we consider whether the announcement pro…le is a CPNE. Note from Lemma 1 part (i) that starting at any two countries (say i and j) have an incentive to coalitionally change their announcements from f ; g and f ; g to fj; g and fi; g respectively, taking country k's announcement …xed: k = f ; g. This initial deviation is self-enforcing since no proper subset of the initially deviating countries (neither i nor j) has an incentive to alter its announcement unilaterally (i.e. announcement pro…le that leads to hiji is a Nash equilibrium). Therefore, the announcement pro…le that leads to h i is not a CPNE.
We next show that ij is not a CPNE. From parts (iii) and (iv) of Lemma 1 we know that starting at ij countries i and k have an incentive to coalitionally change their announcements from fj; g and f ; g to fj; kg and fi; g respectively, taking country j's announcement …xed at j = fi; g. This initial coalitional deviation would convert hiji to hihi where i is the hub and j and k are spokes. Furthermore, this initial coalitional deviation is self-enforcing since no proper subset of the initially deviating countries (neither i nor k) has an incentive to unilaterally alter its announcement since the announcement pro…le ih that leads to hihi is a Nash equilibrium. Therefore, the announcement pro…le ij is not a CPNE.
Finally, we show that ih is not a CPNE. Note from Lemma 1 part (v) that starting at ih countries j and k have an incentive to coalitionally change their announcements from fi; g and fi; g to fi; kg and fi; jg respectively, taking country i's announcement …xed at i = fj; kg. This coalitional deviation converts the trade regime from hihi to hF i. Furthermore, this initial coalitional deviation is self-enforcing since no proper subset of the initially deviating countries (neither j nor k) has an incentive to deviate unilaterally since F is a Nash equilibrium. Therefore, the announcement pro…le ih is not a CPNE.
Proof of Proposition 4
Note …rst that, since the external tari¤ restriction of Article XXIV is assumed to be binding, the welfare level of a member of a bilateral FTA is the same as that of member of a CU, i.e. w i (ij) = w i (ij u ) for all i; j = l; l 0 ; s. Using the welfare levels reported above, we can easily show the following inequalities: We …rst consider the FTA game and prove Proposition 4(i).
CPNE of the FTA game under asymmetry
To avoid redundancy, we focus on parsimonious Nash announcements. Our proof extends to the case of non-parsimonious Nash announcements (which can arise in the FTA game under asymmetry).
First note from inequality (i) that starting at = f s = f ; g; l = f ; g; l 0 = f ; gg the two large countries l and l 0 have an incentive to coalitionally change their announcements from f ; g to fl 0 ; g and fl; g respectively, taking country s's announcement …xed at f ; g. This initial deviation is self-enforcing since no proper subset of the initially deviating countries (neither l nor l 0 ) has an incentive to alter its announcement unilaterally. Therefore, the announcement pro…le that leads to h i is not a CPNE. We next show that the announcement pro…le sl = f s = fl; g; l = f ; sg; l 0 = f ; gg that leads to hsli is not a CPNE. Note …rst that l (sh sl 0 ) > l (sl ) for all . From part (vi) we know that, when > l (sl ) country l has an incentive to unilaterally change its announcement from f ; sg to f ; g and thus the announcement pro…le sl is not even a Nash equilibrium when > l (sl ). Moreover, we know from part (viii) that, when < l (sh sl 0 ), countries s and l have an incentive to coalitionally change their announcements from fl; g and f ; g to fl; l 0 g and f ; sg respectively, taking country l 0 's announcement …xed at f ; sg. This initial coalitional deviation would convert hsl 0 i to hshi and it is self-enforcing in nature. Since l (sh sl 0 ) > l (sl ) for all , it is immediate that the announcement pro…le sl is not a CPNE. Consider now the announcement pro…le sh = f s = fl; l 0 g; l = f ; sg; l 0 = f ; sgg. We know from part (xi) that countries l and l 0 have an incentive to coalitionally change their announcements from f ; sg and f ; sg to fl 0 ; sg and fl; sg respectively, taking country s's announcement …xed at fl; l 0 g. This initial coalitional deviation would convert hshi to hF i. From parts (xii) and (xiii), we know that, when < l (F l 0 h), this coalitional deviation is self-enforcing since neither large country has an incentive to unilaterally alter its announcement. Moreover, we know from part (iv) that countries l and l 0 have an incentive to coalitionally change their announcements from f ; sg and f ; sg to fl 0 ; g and fl; g respectively, taking country s's announcement …xed at fl; l 0 g. This initial coalitional deviation would convert hshi to hll 0 i. From part (iii) we know that this coalitional deviation is self-enforcing when > l (lh ll 0 ). Since l (lh ll 0 ) < < l (F l 0 h) for all for all , the announcement pro…le that sh is not a CPNE. We next consider the announcement pro…le l 0 h = f s = f ; l 0 g; l = fl 0 ; g; l 0 = fl; sgg. Note from part (iii) that w l (lh ll 0 ) < 0 when > l (lh ll 0 ). Thus, under such a case, country l has an incentive to unilaterally change its announcement from fl 0 ; g to f ; g and thus l 0 h is not even a Nash equilibrium when > l (lh ll 0 ). Moreover, we know from part (xii) that, when < l (F l 0 h), countries s and l have an incentive to coalitionally change their announcements from f ; l 0 g and fl 0 ; g to fl 0 ; sg and fl; l 0 g respectively, taking country l 0 's announcement …xed at fl; sg. This initial coalitional deviation would convert hl 0 hi to hF i and it self-enforcing in nature. Given that we have l (F l 0 h) > l (lh ll 0 )
for all , it follows that the announcement pro…le l 0 h is not a CPNE. It is immediate from the above discussion that the only remaining candidates for being a CPNE under the FTA game are the announcement pro…les ll 0 and F . We …rst consider the announcement pro…le ll 0 = f s = f ; g; l = fl 0 ; g; l 0 = fl; gg. On one hand, we know from parts (i), (ii), (iv) and (v) that there exist no unilateral or coalitional announcement deviations that alters the trade regime from hll 0 i to h i, hsli, hshi and hF i. On the other hand, it is immediate from part (iii) that, when < l (lh ll 0 ), countries l and s have an incentive to change their respective announcement pro…les fl 0 ; g and f ; g to fl 0 ; sg and fl; g respectively, taking country l 0 's announcement …xed at l 0 = fl; g. This initial coalitional deviation would convert hll 0 i to hlhi and it is self-enforcing in nature. As a result, the announcement pro…le that leads to hll 0 i is a CPNE when l (lh ll 0 ).
We now show when and why F is a CPNE of the FTA game. Note from part (v) that starting at F = f s = fl; l 0 g; l = fl 0 ; sg; l 0 = fl; sgg countries l and l 0 have an incentive to coalitionally change their announcements from fl 0 ; sg and fl; sg to fl 0 ; g and fl; g respectively, taking country s's announcement …xed at fl; l 0 g. This initial coalitional deviation would convert hF i to hll 0 i. From part (iii), we know that the initial coalitional deviation is self-enforcing only when > l (lh ll 0 ). Note also that when l (lh ll 0 ) there exist no unilateral or self-enforcing coalitional announcement deviations from F since l (lh ll 0 ) < l (F ) and l (lh ll 0 ) < l (F l 0 h). As a result, the announcement pro…le F is a CPNE when l (lh ll 0 ).
We now prove Proposition 4(ii).
CPNE of the CU game under asymmetry It is immediate from parts (i), (ii) and (v) that there exist no unilateral or coalitional announcement deviations from the various announcement pro…les that lead to hll 0 u i. Therefore, all announcement pro…les leading to hll 0 u i are not just CPNE of the CU game but also constitute its strong Nash equilibria. Moreover the announcement pro…les that lead to h i, hsl u i, and hF i fail to be CPNE since the coalitional announcement deviations to the announcement pro…les that lead to hll 
